We are indebted to Price Fishback for editorial guidance and extensive comments. We are also grateful to Bill Collins and Bob Margo for providing their measures of riot intensity; to Price Fishback, Paul Rhode, and Michael Haines for sharing their information on farm operators in the 1930s; and to Paul Rhode for sharing information on the U.S. census plantation counties. We also thank ABSTRACT This paper presents a quantitative analysis of the geographic distribution of spending through the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act (EOA). Using newly assembled state-and county-level data, the results show that the Johnson administration directed funding in ways consistent with the War on Poverty's rhetoric of fighting poverty and racial discrimination: poorer areas and those with a greater share of nonwhite residents received systematically more funding. In contrast to New Deal spending, political variables explain very little of the variation in EOA funding. The smaller role of politics may help explain the strong backlash against the War on Poverty's programs.
1 Many reasons recommend a separate treatment of the two periods. The New Deal was developed in response to high unemployment and the economic crisis of the Great Depression; Johnson launched the War on Poverty during a period of widely shared economic prosperity. The New Deal significantly expanded programs cooperatively administered between the federal and state governments (Fishback and Wallis 2012, p. 291) , whereas the federal government retained the purse strings and discretionary power for many of the War on Poverty programs. Finally, the New Deal built on and expanded many existing national programs (public infrastructure, benefits to veterans, agricultural assistance, and emergency loans for farmers) and significantly expanded unemployment relief-programs that benefited the average American and median voter. In contrast, the War on Poverty made longer-term investments with less tangible effects for smaller subgroups. See Fishback et al. (2003) and Fleck (2008 more than twenty other covariates combined. In the non-South, these two variables alone account for over 60 percent of the explained, within-state variation in OEO spending.
Consistent with New Deal funding patterns, political considerations also influenced where OEO money was spent. We find that the Johnson administration invested in Democratic strongholds and rewarded areas with bigger swings in favor of the Democrats in the 1964 presidential election. Swing counties received slightly less funding overall, but swing counties won by Johnson in 1964 received slightly more OEO money ceteris paribus. But, although politics mattered, political considerations together explain surprisingly little of the county-level variation in OEO funding. Measures of political considerations explain no more than 1 percent of the variation in county-level spending at the national level. In short, the Johnson administration appears to have invested in nonwhite and poor areas much more than in Democratic strongholds, newly won districts, or the districts of powerful congresspersons.
Our analysis of voting reinforces the notion that Johnson's War on Poverty failed to build a Democratic constituency in the short run. Although turnout increased in areas with higher spending, a greater share of votes in nonwhite areas went to Republicans. The paper concludes with a discussion of how these findings inform a better understanding of why the War on Poverty is remembered as a failure.
THE ENACTMENT AND PROVISIONS OF THE ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY ACT
Poverty emerged as a new and pressing social issue in the United States in the late 1950s and early 1960s (O'Connor 2001) . Bestselling books on the topic, including The Affluent Society by John Kenneth Galbraith (1958) and The Other America by Michael Harrington (1962) , as well as popular journal articles, catapulted the issue into the national consciousness. Yet Johnson's motivations for championing the War on Poverty as the centerpiece of his domestic agenda have been subject to disagreement among contemporaries and historians.
The facts are straightforward. Johnson inherited a large legislative backlog from the John F. Kennedy administration. Arthur Schlesinger (1965) argues that Johnson continued what would have been Kennedy's poverty agenda. Yet Walter Heller, the chairman of Kennedy's Council of Economic Advisors (CEA), notes that only days before his Dallas assassination, Kennedy's thinking on the matter "had not gone beyond the vague concept of doing something that would focus specifically on the roots of poverty" (1970, pp. 19-20) . In contrast, Heller recalls Johnson's unequivocal affirmation of the poverty program in his first briefing: "That's my kind of program. I'll find money for it one way or another. If I have to, I'll take away money from things to get money for people.…Give it the highest priority. Push ahead full tilt" (p. 21). In the seven weeks between Kennedy's assassination and Johnson's State of the Union debut, the "War on Poverty" grew from a small, academic pilot program of the CEA to a core agenda of Johnson's presidency. In the next seven months, the EOA morphed from a draft bill into one of the most controversial pieces of legislation passed during Johnson's administration.
The Conception and Promotion of the Economic Opportunity Act
The EOA was the centerpiece of Johnson's War on Poverty and has been remembered as "the most dramatic and highly publicized of the Great Society's programs" (Levitan 1969, p. 3) . It established the OEO, a new agency within the executive branch charged with initiating and coordinating governmentwide antipoverty initiatives.
Shortly after Johnson's State of the Union address, he appointed Sargent Shriver, Kennedy's brotherin-law, to head the antipoverty task force. Within six weeks of his appointment, Shriver claimed that he had consulted with over one hundred different leaders in agriculture, business, labor, and civil rights groups; officials from various levels of government; and academics, administrators, and foundation representatives (Levitan 1969, pp. 30-31) . Johnson's insistence that there be "no doles" and Shriver's commitment to doing things his way meant that social workers and welfare administrators-the embodiment of the old school of thought on reducing poverty-were omitted from this list or given little attention (p. 31). Shriver's task force drafted the final bill (with no input from Congress) and sent the draft EOA to Congress on 16 March 1964.
To promote the EOA, President Johnson embarked on a public relations tour. In April he visited the family of Tom Fletcher, an unemployed coal miner with a wife and eight children who lived in the hollows of Appalachia outside of Inez, Kentucky. The Fletchers had been chosen by the White House to become the face of American poverty-the faces of the 35 million Americans (roughly 20 percent of the population) who lived on less than $3,000 per year, roughly the poverty threshold for a family of four.
Johnson is said to have remarked to a reporter, "I don't know if I'll pass a single law or get a single dollar appropriated, but before I'm through, no community in America will be able to ignore poverty in its midst" (Jordan and Rostow 1986, p. 16) . Indeed, Walter Bennett's iconic Time Magazine photo that captured Johnson chatting with the Fletchers on their front porch achieved just that.
The Enactment of the Economic Opportunity Act
The passage of the EOA was swift and decisive. The Senate approved the bill on 23 July 1964 by a vote of 61 to 34 after only two full days of debate, in which a conservative coalition of Southern Democrats and Republicans succeeded in modestly reducing the authority of the OEO director. 3 On the House side, though final passage took only a few days, the process was more contentious. Levitan (1969, p. 40) notes that Republicans found the EOA hearings "frustrating" because only nine of the 69 primary witnesses opposed the bill. Moreover, Representative Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. (D-NY), chairman of the House Education and Labor Committee that received the bill, excluded Republicans from raising their objections in the hearings and from subsequent participation in the EOA's amendment.
Many congressmen objected to the concentrated power of the OEO director. On 17 March 1964, the first day of hearings before the House's War on Poverty subcommittee, Representative Robert Griffin (R-MI) asked Shriver,
As much as we all admire your work and believe in your competence…I think we must… look at this legislation from the point of view that you may not always be the chief of staff… In every title of this bill, it provides that the Director shall establish criteria to achieve an equitable distribution of funds among the States. I see this as handing to the Director a blank check in terms of deciding how much money the various states are going to get… Do you have any idea at this time how you are going to distribute the money among the States? (U.S. House of Representatives 1964a, pp. 70-71) .
Shriver sardonically replied that the concentration of power in his office conveniently solved the problem of distribution across states by making it easy for Congress to determine whom to fire if things went badly. Unsatisfied with Shriver's answer, Representative Peter Frelinghuysen (R-NJ) announced an 3 The Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report states, "In a series of tight roll calls, the Democratic leadership turned back crippling 'states' rights' amendments by Sens. Winston L. Prouty (R. Vt.) and Spessard L. Holland (D. Fla.)...the final bill included two compromise states' rights amendments, offered by George A. Smathers (D. Fla.)...the first, adopted July 22 by voice vote, permitted the Governor of a state to veto the establishment of a Job Corps camp in his state, within 30 days after being notified of the project. The second, adopted July 23 by an 80-7 roll call, gave the Governor an identical veto power over all anti-poverty projects contracted between the Federal Government and a private agency. Contracts with public bodies, such as city councils and county committees, were not subject to the Governor's disapproval" (Congressional Quarterly. "Senate Passes Johnson's Anti-Poverty Bill, 61-34," 23 July 1964, pp. 1533-34). alternative antipoverty bill on April 28, the last day of the hearings. His bill appropriated funds to antipoverty programs created by states (rather than the OEO) and apportioned funds across the states using an index based on total population, unemployment, and average income (Congressional Record 1964a) . 4 Democrats ultimately compromised to include an apportionment index, but not the one Frelinghuysen proposed.
This compromise was enough to pass the EOA in the House (Gillette 1996, pp. 121-23 This was a prescient criticism of the provision that ultimately would give significant power to Shriver and the Johnson administration to exercise as they saw fit.
Southern Democrats occupied important posts in the House and Senate and had the power to block legislation-a power they had long exercised to protect the interests of the Southern elites (Katznelson 2013) . They succeeded only in securing modest amendments-most notably the inclusion of a gubernatorial veto for key programs ( §209[c]). Shriver recalled that Senator Herman Talmadge (D-GA), a former governor, suggested the veto as a way to let Southerners support the bill while neither alienating states' rights supporters nor "allow[ing] all this money to become bogged down in the state and local government apparatus, and…frustrated totally by the clique that might be hanging around a particular governor" (Gillette 1996, pp. 129-30) . 5 4 Wall Street Journal. "GOP Critic of Johnson's Drive on Poverty Offers Plan with Lower Federal Outlays," 29 April 1964, p. 5. 5 Southern Democrats ultimately voted for passage 60-40 in the House and 11-11 in the Senate ("Congress Clears Johnson's Anti-Poverty Bill," Congressional Quarterly 14 August 1964 , pp. 1729 "CQ Senate Votes 218 through 223," Congressional Quarterly 23 July 1964 , p. 1567 . In practice, the gubernatorial veto was rarely exercised and, when exercised, was so blatantly political that the gubernatorial veto was effectively removed only one year later. In the first year of the OEO's existence, the governors' veto was exercised just five times, including one widely publicized case in May 1965 when George Wallace made a point of blocking a grant to a racially integrated antipoverty program in Birmingham (New York Times. "Wallace Vetoes a Poverty Grant." 13 May 1965, p. 23; Levitan 1969, p. 62) . The 1965 amendments defanged the gubernatorial veto by allowing the OEO director to override a veto if a grant was "reconsidered by the Director and found by him to be fully consistent with the In contrast to state governors, local government had no power in the original EOA. Even though the U.S. Conference of Mayors and National Association of Counties had endorsed the original EOA with the reservation that funds be channeled through an official local poverty agency, the 1964 bill was never revised in this manner (Levitan 1969, p. 65) . Local government had no direct, statutory power to block EOA spending or designate community groups until the EOA was later amended. The President's deftness at influencing the media-liberal and conservative-ensured that those opposed to the EOA looked like they were for poverty and against helping the poor. With the election looming in the fall of 1964 and the President's support surging, the amended 27-page EOA passed the House on 8 August 1964 with a vote of 226 to 185, just three days after it was introduced. 6
The Radical Provisions and Financial Stakes of the Economic Opportunity Act
The EOA was an experiment on a grand scale. About half of the EOA's funding went to programs with a direct chain of command linking local organizations to Washington, such as Job Corps, Work-Study, and Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA); the other half went to the Community Action Program (CAP), which funded ideas put forth by local organizations that were to be customized to the needs of different communities. 7 The OEO designated over 1,000 Community Action Agencies (CAAs) between 1965 and 1968 to coordinate these locally customized antipoverty initiatives.
The CAP was the most novel and idealistic part of the War on Poverty and, unsurprisingly, the most controversial. "Community action" was vaguely defined as a program "which provides services, assistance, and other activities to give promise of progress toward elimination of poverty or a cause or causes of poverty" ( §202 a[2], emphasis added). The EOA also contained three radical provisions about how CAP grants could be made. First, CAP funds were to be allocated across states according to an apportionment index in the legislation. States with more of the nation's poor were supposed to get more provisions and in furtherance of the purposes of [the relevant portions of the EOA]." See Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1965, Public Law 89-253, 79 Stat. §16. In short, the OEO director could largely do as the administration pleased after 1965. 6 Using newly assembled data on individual roll-call votes in the House and Senate (ICPSR 2010), measures of Democratic electoral strength (Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale 2006) , and economic and demographic characteristics (Adler undated) we find that party identity is the most important determinant of a favorable vote on the EOA. Southern Democrats were less likely to vote for the EOA than Democrats of other census regions, but were more likely to cast a favorable vote than Republicans from any region. We find a negative relationship between a positive EOA vote and share of black population-perhaps a prescient resistance to the imminent sea change in race politics encouraged by the EOA that would negatively affect Democrats in subsequent elections. In the House, we also find that unemployment rates were a strong predictor of a positive vote. funding. But within states, the OEO had complete discretion to spend its money in "any…geographical area" ( §202 a[1]). Second, funds need not flow through or to state or local governments. Instead, the EOA authorized the federal government to fund programs "conducted, administered or coordinated by a public or private nonprofit agency (not a political party)" ( §202 a[4]). A final provision noted that CAP programs should be "developed, conducted, and administered with maximum feasible participation of residents of areas and members of groups served" ( §202 a[3]). 8
The combined effect of the EOA's provisions was to allow Shriver to circumvent state and local governments, which many believed had failed to alleviate poverty or, worse, been complicit or instrumental in its persistence. This direct funding mechanism allowed the federal government to work around de facto exclusion of the poor from designing programs to address their own poverty and de jure racial segregation that had restricted the political participation of African Americans. 9 CAPs aimed to empower the poor themselves to change their communities-to fight poverty while reforming local social institutions and undermining entrenched racial segregation (Forget 2011 ).
These radical provisions would have mattered little had the demands of the OEO been modest or the financial stakes small. But Johnson's choice of Sargent Shriver to head the poverty task force and the EOA's funding for local organizations made the EOA matter.
Shriver had an impressive record of political effectiveness. According to Murray Kempton, Shriver could weather the political attacks of Congress by day but "then at night he will call up some power figure from [the Representative's] district and the next morning [the Representative] is unexpectedly slapped on the back of the head." 10 Shriver maintained independent staffing and funding criteria. He also linked OEO funding to compliance with the 1964 Civil Rights Act and interpreted "maximum feasible 8 Levitan (1969, pp. 110-11) writes that most of the Johnson administration officials who testified to Congress regarding the EOA were naïve about the implications of this clause. Only Robert Kennedy, the chairman of the Cabinet Committee on Juvenile Delinquency, which oversaw an earlier, localized federal community action program, mentioned the provision of "maximum feasible participation" in his congressional testimony. Kennedy argued that "there certainly should be an opening to deal with local agencies, private and public, who could get together and come up with a plan or an organization which could handle a particular function." 9 Strom Thurmond (D-SC) railed against this provision during the debate over the EOA: "Under the innocent sounding title of 'Community Action Programs,' the poverty czar would not only have the power to finance the activities of such organizations as the National Council of Churches, the NAACP, SNCC, and CORE, but also a SNOOP and a SNORE which are sure to be organized to get their part of the green gravy." Thurmond also accused Shriver of having promised the NAACP that he'd use the OEO to promote desegregation ("CQ Senate Votes 218 through 223." Congressional Quarterly 23 July 1964, p. 1567). Thurmond would change his party affiliation to Republican the following September. 10 Kempton, Murray. "The Essential Sargent Shriver." New Republic, 28 March 1964, p. 13. participation" for CAA boards more strictly than was popular.
The federal funding at stake was large. From 1965 to 1968, the CAP funds amounted to a cumulative $2.64 billion (in real 1968 dollars). While small in relation to other federal expenditures, these funds were large relative to local government spending on related programs. Average, annual real CAP funding from 1965 to 1968 amounted to over a 25 percent increase relative to the sum of local government welfare expenditures in 1962. Furthermore, public welfare spending was often lower in the poor counties where CAP funds went. In 791 funded counties, average real CAP grants from 1965 to 1968 more than doubled 1962 public welfare spending. In addition, CAP grants were made to 83 counties which in 1962 spent nothing on public welfare (OEO 1965 (OEO -1968 U. S. Bureau of the Census 1964). 11 Roughly 38 percent of CAP dollars went to Head Start and another 39 percent went to local initiative programs (Levitan 1969, p. 123 ). CAP money, therefore, represented a tremendous increase in funding available for local antipoverty programs.
The direct financial stakes also understate the broader implications of federal dollars for communities. In addition to over 18 million people who participated in CAP programs (equivalent to half of America's poor), Shriver told Congress in 1965 that "the most important and exciting thing about the War on Poverty" was "that all America is joining in…religious groups, professional groups, labor groups, civic and patriot groups are all rallying to the call" (Gettleman and Mermelstein 1966, p. 207). 12 Similarly, the New York Times featured the "group of leaders" in "every city and community" who "believe this job can be done and who are helping." 13 Importantly, CAP dollars may have crowded in local resources from public, private, and nonprofit sources, making the financial stakes even higher. 14 In summary, the EOA allowed tremendous federal discretionary power over a meaningful amount of 11 County-level data are created by aggregating data on individual CAP grant actions from NACAP files to the county-year level. These data contain 162,795 individual grant actions to 4,818 grantee organizations from 1965 to 1981 (figures for 1969 are lost). They also include information on funding amounts from the OEO, cost sharing by local governments and other sources, the name and address of the grantee (county, city, street address, and name of the grantee), and brief descriptions of grants' intended uses. See our data appendix for more detail. 12 The 18 million figure relies upon summing over all participants recorded in administrative records. 13 Reston, James. "The Problem of Pessimism in the Poverty Program." New York Times, 10 January 1965, p. E12. 14 Much has been written about the controversy surrounding the CAP program, but the vast majority of CAAs functioned with the support of their communities. When the 1967 EOA amendments required that the CAAs be designated by state or local governments (and that the OEO director could designate CAAs only in the event that local governments failed to exercise their authority), 792 of the affected 1,018 state, county, or city governments exercised their new authority to designate CAAs within the year. Moreover, 97 percent of these governments elected to continue the existing CAA without change (Levitan 1969, p. 67 )-a testament to the program's widespread local approval.
resources. Our analysis adds to the historical literature on this topic by quantifying how the administration used this discretion in two steps. First, we investigate whether the OEO complied with the EOA's apportionment index, which was added as a check on the director's power. Second, we investigate how the OEO spent money within states, which was not prescribed by legislation. Both shed light on the how the War on Poverty was fought.
WAS THE INDEX BINDING? OEO FUNDING DECISIONS AT THE STATE LEVEL
The EOA nominally imposed a constraint on Shriver's discretion by requiring that the OEO allocate 78.4 percent of federal CAP funds (what we call "index eligible funds") across the 50 states and the District of Columbia using the apportionment index. The index assigned a share of eligible funds to each state, s, in a fiscal year (FY; July 1 to June 30 in this period), t, using the following formula,
where UE is the state's share of the national number of unemployed, PA is the state's share of the national public assistance recipients, and PK is the state's share of poor children (defined as the number of children in families with household incomes below $1,000 announced the appointees to run the EOA-funded antipoverty program, but many objected (and wrote to Washington) that the appointees were "rabid segregationists" (Germany 2007, p. 49 1964b, §2; 1967, §2) . The OEO's difficulties spending its allocation in its first FY-due to Shriver asserting his authority and challenges setting up programs-is captured in Figure 1A . By the end of the first FY on 30 June 1965, the CAP had only existed for nine months and spending reached only $143 million of the budgeted $199 million in nondiscretionary funds. Forty-one states lie below the 45-degree line because they received less than their EOA minimum apportionment in federal funds. Many states fell very far below their apportionment:
Mississippi received about 3 percent of its apportionment; South Carolina, 7 percent; and Nebraska, 11 percent. These surpluses at the OEO resolved within several years as local organizations developed more applications and as OEO administrators succeeded in making grants. By FY 1966, most states had moved closer to or exceeded the 45-degree line; many had crossed it ( Figure 1B ). In this year, each apportionment dollar translated into $1.14 in actual funding ( Third, the OEO largely allocated CAP funds across states in proportion to the apportionment index.
This was the case both for the nondiscretionary index-apportioned spending and the discretionary spending. The apportionment index explains 76 to 93 percent of the variation in state-level CAP spending across the four fiscal years (Table 1A , columns 1-4) and exceeds 93 percent for the entire period (column 5). The inclusion of region fixed effects has almost no effect on this relationship (Table 1B) .
Considering the tremendous power given to the OEO director, that it allowed antipoverty programs to be customized to community needs and would create pressure for the reform of social institutions that perpetuated an economic underclass. In practice, this flexibility allowed the Johnson administration to pursue its broader agenda. How these funds were spent, therefore, reveals much about the Johnson administration's objectives.
The Competing Objectives of Politics and Poverty
Fighting poverty and building political coalition were potentially competing objectives determining the Johnson administration's funding choices. One hypothesis is that Johnson used the War on Poverty to forge a new electoral consensus, much as Roosevelt had used the New Deal (Wright 1974; Couch and Shugart 1998; Wallis 1984 Wallis , 1987 Wallis , 1998 Wallis , 2001 Fishback, Kantor, and Wallis 2003; Fleck 2001; Fishback and Wallis 2012) . Johnson cut his political teeth as a New Dealer and may have learned from Roosevelt's and Harry Hopkins' alleged claim to "tax and tax and spend and spend and elect and elect" (Fishback 2007) . Congressional testimony following the EOA's first year claimed as much, saying that its funding had degenerated into "giant fiestas of political patronage." 18
Building political consensus should result in measurable spending patterns. As Gavin Wright (1974) and Robert Fleck (2008) These variables allow us to test whether major committee members or chairs brought more funding to 18 Congressional Quarterly Almanac. "Antipoverty Program Funds Doubled," 1965, pp. 405-20 . Multiple accounts reflect this thinking in the months leading up to the passage of the EOA. For instance, Johnson promised a reluctant congressman that despite CAP's direct grant mechanism, no money would be spent in his district "that hasn't got your initial on it, or mine" (McKee 2011, p. 50 Clark (D-PA), Johnson commented, "Lincoln abolished slavery, and we're going to abolish poverty" (Miller Center 1964) .
Our analysis tests the importance of fighting poverty and racial discrimination by examining the relationship of EOA funding with measures of poverty and the nonwhite share of the population. Greater spending of EOA money in areas with higher poverty rates is broadly consistent with the Johnson administration targeting funds in accordance with the War on Poverty platform. We also examine the extent of this commitment. Whereas politically expedient adherence to the platform might result in the targeting of funds to areas with more citizens just under the poverty line, a more sincere (and less expedient) approach might target the most disadvantaged areas. These areas could show less measureable improvement by official poverty rates, even if livelihoods and individual welfare improved significantly (albeit not enough to cross the poverty threshold). We measure the intensity of disadvantage by the share 20 "Keeping funding out" relates closely to Alston and Ferrie's hypothesis about the political power and interests of the Southern Democrats. They argue that, after slavery was abolished, Southern plantations owned by the elites developed a system of plantation paternalism to attract and retain labor. Compliant laborers were rewarded with economic support and protection, and this system allowed Southern plantations to retain a supply of cheap workers to keep the plantation system functioning (Alston and Ferrie 1993; 1999) . To protect this paternalist system, the South had opposed federal antipoverty programs during Reconstruction and the New Deal, which threatened to give agricultural laborers better outside options. (Thus, for example, agricultural workers were excluded from the original Social Security program. See Alston and Ferrie 1999, pp. 67-70; Newman and O'Brien 2011, pp. 7-20) . As the invention of a mechanical cotton harvester made low-wage labor less important and the obligations of paternalism thus became a burden to the landed elite, the South's incentives for blocking federal welfare legislation fell. Mechanization, in effect, made a federal antipoverty program more appealing to Southern elites-as long as the programs were implemented in other areas and would encourage the outmigration of black and poor white farm laborers. We examine whether Johnson earned the support, or at least the neutrality, of Southern power brokers by not making CAP grants in areas dominated by Southern paternalism. Such a pattern would suggest that members of Congress had compromised with Johnson about the EOA's implementation in their districts instead of blocking the EOA's passage.
of individuals in households with incomes below $2,000 and $1,000.
Spending OEO money in areas with more nonwhites is consistent with the Johnson administration's battle against racial discrimination and Johnson's antipoverty agenda. Not only did African Americans have twice the national poverty rate of whites, but de jure and de facto institutions limited their opportunities to escape poverty. The distribution of more OEO funding directly to communities with more racial minorities could empower these minorities to develop their own antipoverty programs. It also could diffuse civil unrest and rioting (Gillezeau 2012) or reduce crime rates by allowing minorities greater access to formal institutions (Cunningham 2013 the Census 1930; Depew et al. 2012) . 23 Table 2 presents Democratic share in the 1964 presidential election has roughly the same effect as a one standard-deviation increase in poverty-about 0.16 of a standard deviation increase in funding. Not only did more Democratic counties receive more money per capita, funds also rewarded districts with larger increases in Democratic share in the presidential elections between 1960 and 1964, with a one standard-deviation increase in this variable leading to 0.20 of a standard deviation increase in funding. Whereas swing counties received less funding, swing counties won by Democrats received slightly more ceteris paribus.
Determinants of County-Level OEO Spending
These findings are robust to the inclusion of identical covariates for the 1960 presidential election as well as to alternative definitions of "swing" areas. In short, the Johnson administration invested in its new Democratic constituency by directing OEO funds to Democrat-trending areas as well as to Democratic strongholds. In contrast, we find no evidence that congressional committee membership during the 89th
Congress mattered at all (the results for the 88th and 90th Congress do not alter this conclusion). Counties with representatives on major House committees, chairing major committees, or in positions of leadership (Democratic or Republican) have no predictive power in any of our regressions.
Presidential politics, however, explains very little of county-level OEO's funding decisions. To make the relative contributions of poverty and politics more explicit, we summarize the partial R 2 values of these sets of variables at the bottom of Table 2 -a simple metric for determining how much of the variation in within-state per capita CAP funding is explained by the set of poverty variables or the set of political variables. 24 The R 2 value for the political variables is 0.004 (column 5), significantly lower than for the poverty variables. Across specifications, approximately 3 percent of the variation in funding is explained by poverty, or 30 percent of the variation explained by the model. Politics explains less than 1 percent in all cases.
Much of the history of the War on Poverty focuses on the South and its interaction with civil rights.
The majority of nonwhites lived in the South, and Table 2 shows that the nonwhite population share played an important role in shaping OEO funding. Moreover, the paternalism hypothesis (Alston and Ferrie 1993, 1999) suggests that local economic, demographic, and political considerations may have had different effects in the South. For both reasons, Table 3 splits our sample into non-Southern and Southern counties, roughly partitioning the country into halves (46 percent of all counties are in the South).
The results highlight some similarities and differences between the regions: poverty rates and share nonwhite have a strong and robust relationship to OEO spending. Similarly, changes in the share of a county voting for Democrats also matters in both regions, although Democratic strongholds do not appear to be rewarded in the South (where most places were Democratic strongholds). The economic significance of each of these variables, however, is weaker in the South. A one standard-deviation increase in Southern poverty rates or share nonwhite implies a 0.12 and 0.11 standard deviation increase in EOA spending, respectively (column 4). This is one-half (for poverty) to one-fifth (for share nonwhite)
the magnitude of these effects in the rest of the United States (column 1).
The results also reveal striking differences in funding patterns between the two regions. First, roughly 40 percent of the variation in per capita OEO funding is explained by the model in non-Southern regions (partial R 2 , columns 1 to 3). In the South, less than 3 percent is explained by the model (columns 4 to 6). Second, the lion's share of the explained variation outside the South is accounted for by the poverty variables (25 to 27 percent), whereas in the South very little of the variation is explained by poverty measures (less than 1 percent in all cases). Third, presidential politics seem to matter very little in general and even less in the South. Putting aside the fact that these estimates are statistically insignificant, their magnitude in the South is half the size of the implied effects elsewhere.
Correlations of OEO Spending with Electoral Outcomes
Our final analysis investigates whether EOA money was successful in building the Democratic , 1952,…, 1958, 1962,…, 1972 (note: 1960 Notably, these patterns differ across regions. Voter turnout in poor areas increased in non-Southern regions ( Figure 4B ) but not in the South (Figure 4C ), whereas voter turnout in nonwhite areas increased in the South ( Figure 4C ) but not in non-Southern areas ( Figure 4B) . Interestingly, the share of the vote for Democrats changed little in poorer areas of the non-South ( Figure 4E ), whereas Democratic vote share rose sharply in poorer areas of the South (Figure 4F ). For more nonwhite areas, Democratic vote share increased in the non-South ( Figure 4E ) but fell sharply in the South (Figure 4F ). On the whole, these results are consistent with the Democrats' strategy backfiring, but only somewhat. Although turnout increased after 1964 in areas getting greater EOA funding, Democrats gained fewer of these votes than the Republicans did, and in the region where they gained the greatest share among the poor-the Souththey appear to have lost more to the politics of race (see also Cascio and (Wimer et al. 2013) . A complementary, consumption-based measure of poverty registers a 26 percentage point decline from 1960 to 2010, with just over two-thirds of this decline occurring before 1980 (Meyer and Sullivan 2012) . Many benefits were also longer-run in nature: a growing literature argues that many War on Poverty programs were fairly successful at increasing human capital, improving health, and reducing racial inequality over the longer term (Ludwig and Miller 2007; Chay et al. 2010; Cascio et al. 2010; Almond et al. 2011; Bailey 2012; Gillezeau 2012; Bailey and Goodman-Bacon 2012; Bailey 2013; Cunningham 2013; Almond et al. forthcoming) . It is puzzling that the Johnson administration did not get credit for some of these successes.
A second hypothesis is that the "failure" narrative reflects the success of critics in rewriting history.
But this claim forgets the fact that President Ronald Reagan's quip in his 1988 State of the Union that "the federal government fought the war on poverty, and poverty won" was not new. Allegations of the War on Poverty's failure dates to critics in both political parties. Accounts from the late 1960s argued that the CAP programs were born of conflicting ideas and administrative chaos-the programs of professors, not practitioners (Levine 1970; Forget 2011) . 25 Prominent scholars agreed saying that the War on Poverty's "promises were extreme; the specific remedial actions were untried and untested; [and] the finances were grossly inadequate" (Ginzberg and Solow 1974, p. 219) .
The difference in historical memory of the War on Poverty and the New Deal is striking. Although the New Deal's effectiveness as a set of policies has been contested in scholarship, its policies-even without a large or immediate rebound in private sector employment-were regarded as successful at the time as they are remembered today. This collective memory of the New Deal's success transcends party lines. When criticized for dismantling New Deal programs, Reagan corrected reporters noting he had voted for Roosevelt four times and remarked, "I'm trying to undo the Great Society…it was LBJ's war on poverty that led us to our present mess" (Berkowitz 2001, p. 98 Political variables 0.004 0.010 0.009 0.009 Notes: The unit of observation is a county or "super-county," whichever is the lowest unit of geographic aggregation observed in all of our data sources. Estimates are obtained by ordinary least squares regression of the specification described in equation (2). The dependent variable is the residual of a regression of real federal expenditures through the Community Action Program from 1965 to 1968 on state fixed effects. Suppressed covariates include percent of a county's population that is rural or farm and percent that is urban, under the age of 5, over the age of 64, or lives in a household with more than $10,000 in annual income. They also include the Vietnam casualty rate, a measure of riot intensity (Collins and Margo 2007) , the number of sharecroppers per total farm operators, local government's direct expenditures per capita (1962), direct expenditures on welfare (1962) , and total tax receipts per capita (1962) . Estimates are unweighted. Stars denote statistical significance as follows: * = 5 percent level. ** = 1 percent level. *** = .5 percent level. Huber-White standard errors are in brackets. The county sample includes the coterminous United States, excluding the District of Columbia. Sources: See data appendix for more details and analysis appendix for coefficients on suppressed covariates. . Fiscal Year 1965 B. Fiscal Year 1966 C. Fiscal Year 1967 D. Fiscal Year 1968 Notes: The x-axis indicates the total minimum funding according to the EOA poverty index for each state for the relevant fiscal year in millions of 1968 dollars. See equation (1) and the text for details. The y-axis indicates actual federal allocations in millions of 1968 dollars for each state for the relevant fiscal year, including index allocations and the remaining 20 percent of CAP funds at Shriver's discretion. The solid line is the 45-degree line, and the dashed line is fit by least squares regression. A state will fall along the 45degree line if it received the minimum apportioned in the EOA. Points above the 45-degree line indicate that a state received more than its minimum apportionment, whereas points below the line indicate the reverse.
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